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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the effect of Cournot competition with dif-
ferentiated products on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-
owned firm, with three different structures in the financial market:
monopoly, duopoly and Stackelberg. We show that the degree of prod-
uct differentiation does not affect the results found in the literature
on insider trading, concerning the effect of the financial market struc-
ture on firms’ outputs, the revelation of information and the insiders’
orders. Besides, firms’ output, the amount of information revealed in
the stock price, the insiders’ trading orders and the owners’ profits are
independent of the degree of product differentiation. The real market
structure through the degree of product differentiation is found to de-
termine the level of the compensation scheme earned by the manager,
the market makers’ response to the total order flow signal as well as
the managers’ profits.1
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1 Introduction
Consumer goods are nowadays available in a variety of styles and labels. In-
deed, different brands of cigarettes, toothpaste, shower gel, cosmetics and
breakfast foods are on sale in every retail store. Those variations within a
product class, referred to as ”product differentiation”, are designed to spice
up the lives of consumers and fulfill the hidden nooks and crannies of their
wants. Product differentiation in packaging, design, color, style and location
of outlet (horizontal differentiation) or in product quality (vertical differ-
entiation) makes consumer goods imperfect substitutes to each other, thus
offering firms market power.
Understanding product differentiation is crucial to perceiving how modern
market economies operate. Product differentiation is the outstanding fea-
ture of the real world of monopolistic competition initially introduced by
Chamberlin (1933). The monopolistic competition structure is characterized
by many firms differentiating their products to benefit from market power,
with free exit and entry of firms in the long run. This combination of com-
petitive and monopoly elements made the work of Chamberlin so valuable
to the modern microeconomic theory and led to interesting theoretical and
empirical research on product differentiation (Anderson et al., 1992; Beath
and Katsoulacos, 1991; Berry, 1994; Nevo, 1998; Shaked and Sutton, 1982,
1983 and 1987; Sutton, 1986, etc.).
The importance of product differentiation has been highlighted in many fields
such as International Trade, Endogenous Growth Theory, New Economic
Geography and Macroeconomics. In this paper, we investigate the effect of
product differentiation on the transmission of information and on the price of
securities. Indeed, in the world of stock markets and firms, information is not
or cannot be made public, except by observing market outputs. The type of
market structure determines how firms behave, mainly how they choose the
quantity produced and the price. In turn, those are taken into consideration
by the market maker while chooses the stock price and by the insiders when
2
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they determine their trading strategies.
In this paper, we analyze insider trading in a static model in the spirit of
Kyle (1985) where the insider is also the manager of the firm whose stock
he trades in. In the real market, the publicly-owned firm is in competition
with another privately-owned firm, producing a horizontally differentiated
product. While the effect of Cournot duopoly on the real and financial ac-
tivities of the firm has been previously tackled in Jain and Mirman (2002),
this paper is a first attempt to investigate the effects of Cournot duopoly
with differentiated products on insider trading. We first study the effects of
product differentiation with a financial market characterized by one insider.
Then, we extend the analysis to incorporate another type of competition
supposed to affect the price of securities, competition between two insiders
in the financial market. Specifically, we analyze the effects of Cournot and
Stackelberg competition between the insiders on the benchmark model.
The relation between the real and financial decisions of the firm has been
deeply investigated in the theoretical research on insider trading in the spirit
of Kyle (1985). The leading paper on this subject was the work of Jain and
Mirman (2000). They assume that the insider, who maximizes his profits
by trading on the financial market of the firm, is also the manager of that
firm who can influence the different variables on the market of the real good
and in turn the firm’s profits, thus affecting its value in the financial market.
Jain and Mirman (2000) first show that with the inclusion of monopoly in
the real market, the market maker benefits from an additional source of in-
formation, the market price of the real good. Consequently, the stock price
reveals more information, in comparison with Kyle (1985) or Rochet and
Vila (1994). Many extensions of Jain and Mirman (2000) then follow: Jain
and Mirman (2002) assume that the publicly owned firm competes with an-
other one in a Cournot way in the real market. They show that Cournot
duopoly in the real sector does not alter the amount of information revealed.
However, the insider’s profits and his compensation scheme are lower than
Jain and Mirman (2000), due to Cournot competition in the real sector.
Karam and Daher (2011) assume that the production of the real good by the
publicly-owned firm involves constant labor costs as well as costs of inter-
mediate goods produced by another privately-owned firm. They show that
insider trading affects the markets of both the final and the intermediate
goods, and the financial market variables change due to the insider’s real
decisions. However, when compared to Jain and Mirman (2000) and (2002),
the two-tier real market structure does not alter the amount of information
disseminated in the stock price or the level of insider trading.
3
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Daher and Mirman (2006, 2007) consider another interesting extension of
Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002), by modeling Cournot competition between
two insiders (the owner and the manager) in the financial market. They show
that Cournot competition in the financial sector increases the amount of in-
formation incorporated in the stock price with respect to Jain and Mirman
(2000, 2002). The profits of the manager sometimes increase and sometimes
decrease, relatively to Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002), depending on the vari-
ances of the exogenous variables. However, the profits of the manager and the
owner are lower in the Cournot-real case (Daher and Mirman, 2006) than in
the monopoly-real case (Daher and Mirman, 2007). Wang and Wang (2010)
introduce Stackelberg competition in the real market to the model of Daher
and Mirman (2007) and support the conclusion that competition in the real
sector does not affect the degree of information revelation. In Wang et al.
(2009), the manager acts as a Stackelberg-follower in the financial sector to
the owner who knows the manager’s reaction function. The authors show
that Stackelberg competition in the financial sector increases the amount of
information revealed and the owner’s profits, in comparison with Daher and
Mirman (2006). The manager’s profits may decrease or increase depending
on the exogenous parameters of the model.
Daher et al. (2012) investigated the importance of the competition structure
in the financial market modeled alone, on the dissemination of information.
They start by a natural extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) to include
Cournot duopoly in the financial market. Recall that in Jain and Mirman
(1999), the marker maker is allowed to observe, in addition to the total order
flow, another signal of the value of the asset. The authors show that the stock
price reveals more information with respect to Jain and Mirman (1999). The
unconditional profits of each insider also decrease. Those results are similar
to Daher and Mirman (2007), when compared to Jain and Mirman (2000).
They also investigate the effect of Stackelberg competition in the financial
market modeled alone and show that the manager (follower) trades less and
hence earns less than in the Cournot case. However, the owner (the leader)
trades more than in Cournot and earns more profits relative to the Cournot
case. They also notice that the price reveals more information in the Stack-
elberg than in the Cournot structure. Finally, they take into consideration
the real activities of the firm with Stackelberg competition in the financial
sector. They confirm the results found in the literature that the introduction
of the real market does not affect the amount of information revealed in the
stock price.
4
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In this paper, we analyze the effect of Cournot competition with differenti-
ated products on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm,
with three different structures in the financial market: monopoly, duopoly
and Stackelberg. We show first that the degree of product differentiation does
not alter the results found in the literature on insider trading, concerning the
effect of the financial structure on firms’ outputs. In other words, the firm’s
output is lower in the monopoly case than in the duopoly case, and lower
in the duopoly case than in the Stackelberg case. Second, as shown in the
literature, the financial market structure appears to affect the revelation of
information incorporated in the stock price. Indeed, with Stackelberg com-
petition among the insiders, the amount of information revealed in the stock
price is greater than in the Cournot case, and greater in the Cournot case than
in the monopoly case. Besides, the amount of information revealed in the
stock price is independent of the degree of product differentiation. Third, we
also find that, in line with the industrial organization theory, the manager’s
orders in the monopoly case are greater than his orders in the duopoly case
which themselves are greater than his orders in the Stackelberg case. More-
over, due to his leadership role in the financial market, the owner’s orders are
greater under Stackelberg competition than his orders under Cournot com-
petition. We also show that all insiders’ orders are independent of the degree
of product differentiation. Finally, we show that the owner’s profits are not
influenced by the real market structure. Indeed, the owner’s profits under
Stackelberg competition are greater than his profits under the Cournot case.
However, the real market structure through the degree of product differentia-
tion is found to determine the level of the compensation scheme earned by the
manager, the market makers’ response to the total order flow signal as well
as the insiders’ profits. We show that for these variables, the degree of dif-
ferentiation and the exogenous variances determine their comparative statics.
The importance of the present paper resides in the fact that it generalizes
the previous works on insider trading. Indeed, with extreme values of the
product differentiation parameter, we obtain the results of the monopoly and
duopoly cases of Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002) with one insider, those of Da-
her and Mirman (2007, 2006) with Cournot competition between two insiders
and those of Daher et al. (2012) and Wang et al. (2009) with Stackelberg
competition between two insiders.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the benchmark
model and its extensions. Section 3 presents the equilibrium results and in
Section 4 we discuss the equilibrium outcomes.
5
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2 Models
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, all the random variables are defined
with respect to this probability space. Consider an economy that consists
of differentiated real goods and one financial asset. In the real market, we
examine a duopoly where firms sell differientiated goods by setting quantities.
The inverse demand facing this industry is linear and stochastic:
q′i = (a− yi − θyj)z˜ i, j = 1, 2 i 6= j, a > 0
where θ ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of product differentiation: the higher θ,
the lower the degree of product differentiation is. The prior distribution of z˜
is normal with mean z¯ (assumed to be positive) and variance σ2z . q
′
i is the real
price of the output yi of firm i (i = 1, 2). Both firms are standard neoclassical
firms with respect to the real sector. With respect to the financial sector, firm
2 is privately owned and privately financed, while firm 1 is publicly owned. In
other words, the financial asset is the stock of firm 1 that is publicly traded
in a competitive stock market. The value of the asset is the net profits of
the firm per share. Firm 1 is managed by an insider whose knowledge can
be used in the stock market.
In the financial market, we consider three types of market structures: monopoly,
duopoly and Stackelberg competition among the insiders. Those structures
will be respectively denoted by Model 1, 2 and 3. Without loss of generality,
we expose Model 2. 2 Specifically, there are three types of agents trading in
the financial market. First, there are two risk-neutral rational traders: the
manager of firm 1 and the ”owner”,3 without any managerial responsibilities.
The owner is assumed to have the same private information about the asset
as the manager. The two insiders know the realization z of z˜ and trade in
the stock market based on their inside information. Second, there are (non-
rational) noise traders, representing small investors with no information on
z. The aggregate noise trade is assumed to be a random variable u˜, which
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2u. Finally, there are
K (K ≥ 2) risk-neutral market makers who act like Bertrand competitors.
We assume, as in Jain and Mirman (2000) (Henceforth, JM), that the market
2Model 2 generalizes Model 1 and the only difference with Model 3 is the timing of the
game. Indeed, in Model 3, the insiders do not trade simultaneously as in Model 2. Instead,
the owner moves first and thus takes into account the reaction curve of the manager’s trade
in his maximization problem. In appendix B, we derive the equilibrium results for Model
3.
3The ”owner” is another informed trader (a CEO or a member of the board of directors
for example), who does not have any managerial responsibilities.
6
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makers observe two signals, a noisy signal from the real market, denoted by
the random variable q˜ = (a−y1−θy2)(z˜+ ε˜), where ε˜ is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2ε , and the total order flow signal. We assume
that z˜, u˜ and ε˜ are pairwise independent.
Following Kyle (1985), the trading mechanism is organized in two steps. In
step one, a linear pricing rule and optimal order rule are determined by the
market makers and the insider, respectively, as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
The market makers determine a (linear) pricing rule p, based on their a
priori beliefs, where p is a measurable function p : R×R −→ R. Each insider
i (i = 1, 2) chooses a stock trade function x˜i = xi(z˜), where xi : R −→
R is a measurable function. In the second step, the insider observes the
realization z4 of z˜ and submit his stock order to the market makers based
on the equilibrium stock trade functions. The market makers also receive
orders from the noise traders. All these orders arrive as a total order flow
signal r˜ =
∑2
i=1 xi(z˜) + u˜. The two signals, the real signal and the order
flow signal, are used by the market makers to set the price p˜ = p(q˜, r˜), based
on the equilibrium price function, to clear the market. The insider knows
only the value of z˜ and does not know the values of u˜, ε˜, r˜, z˜ + ε˜ before his
trading strategies are made. Moreover, each market maker does not know
the realization z of z˜ but only knows its distribution. Finally, the market
makers cannot observe either xi, u or ε.
The value per share of the firm is the net profits of the firm per share.
Hence, the values per share of firm 1 and 2 are respectively given by v′ =
(a−y1−θy2)y1z˜ and v2 = (a−y2−θy1)y2z¯. The profit of the rational trader
is:
Π1 = (v
′ −B2 − p) · x˜+B2x˜
where B2 is the compensation scheme of the manager.
5 The compensation
scheme of the manager is determined endogenously in order to satisfy the
second order condition of the maximization problem of the manager. Thus,
after adjusting for the compensation scheme of the manager, the value of
firm 1 becomes: v˜ = v′ −B2.
This is a game of incomplete information because the market makers, unlike
the insider, do not know the realization of z˜. Hence, we seek for a Bayesian-
4Random variables are denoted with a tilde. Realized values lack the tilde. The mean
of the random variable is denoted with bar.
5See Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002) and Daher and Mirman (2006, 2007) for more
details.
7
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Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a vector of five functions
[y1(.), y2(.), x1(.), x2(.), p(., .)] such that:
(a) Profit maximization of firm 2,
(a− y2 − θy1)y2z¯ ≥ (a− y′2 − θy1)y′2z¯ (1)
for any level of output y′2 produced by the firm 2;
(b) Profit maximization of the manager,
E[(a− y1 − θy2)y1z˜ − p[(a− y1 − θy2)(z˜ + ε˜)), (x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜)]x1(z˜)]
≥ E[(a− y′1 − θy2)y′1z˜ − p[(a− y′1 − θy2)(z˜ + ε˜)], (x′1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜))x′1(z˜)] (2)
for any level of output y′1 produced by the firm 1 and any alternative
trading strategy x′1(z˜);
(c) Profit maximization of the owner,
E[(a− y1 − θy2)y1z˜ −B2 − p[(a− y1 − θy2)(z˜ + ε˜)), (x1(z˜) + x2(z˜) + u˜)]x2(z˜)]
≥ E[(a− y1 − θy2)y1z˜ −B2 − p[(a− y−1 θy2)(z˜ + ε˜)], (x1(z˜) + x′2(z˜) + u˜))x′2(z˜)] (3)
for any alternative trading strategy x′2(z˜);
(d) Semi-Strong Market Efficiency: The pricing rule p(., .) satisfies,
p(q˜, r˜) = E[v˜|q˜, r˜]. (4)
Note that conditions (1), (2) and (3) define the optimal strategies of the two
firms while condition (4) guarantees the zero expected profits for the market
makers. The stock price, set by the market makers, is equal to the conditional
expectation of the asset value given their information. We restrict our study
to linear equilibrium. The normal distributions of the exogenous random
variables, together with the particular expression of the demand, enable us
to derive and to prove the existence of a unique linear equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium Results
In order to derive the unique linear equilibrium, we start by solving the
maximization problem of the two firms. The objective of firm 2 is to produce
an optimal quantity of outputs, y2(.), to maximize,
v2 = (a− y2 − θy1)y2z¯ (5)
8
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.14 
The first order condition is,
y2 =
(a− θy1)
2
(6)
The decision rule of the manager of firm 1 is the pair (y1(z˜), x1(z˜)). The
manager’s expected profits are,
G1 = E[(a− y1− θy2)y1z˜− p[(a− y1− θy2)(z˜+ ε˜), (
∑
i
xi(z˜) + u˜)]x1(z˜)] (7)
The first order conditions are,
x1(z˜) =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 − µ2x˜2
2µ2
and y1 =
(a− θy2 + µ1)
2
.
(8)
Similarly, the first order condition of the owner’s maximization problem is
given by,
x2(z˜) =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 −B2 − µ2x˜1
2µ2
(9)
Computing the equilibrium quantities in the real sector from (6) and (8), we
get,
y1 =
2− θ
4− θ2a+
2
4− θ2µ1 and y2 =
2− θ
4− θ2a−
θ
4− θ2µ1 (10)
Arranging for the insiders’ trading orders in equations (8) and (9) we obtain,
x1(z˜) =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 +B2
3µ2
(11)
and
x2(z˜) =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 − 2B2
3µ2
(12)
First, note that the outputs produced by the two firms are deterministic.
This is due to the fact that the variable z˜ is multiplicative6 and implies that
the trading levels of the insiders, which are a linear function of z˜, are normal
random variables. Second, the two signals received by the market makers, i.e.
the real signal q˜ and the total order flow signal r˜, are both normal random
variables (since z˜, u˜ and ε˜ are mutually independent).
6Perhaps, it would be more interesting to have a model with output that depends on
the value of z˜. However, this would be inconsistent with the normality of the trading
functions as well as the signals, and would thus be inconsistent with the linearity of the
pricing function.
9
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Table1: Equilibrium outcomes
Variables Monopoly Duopoly Stackelberg
y1
2− θ
4− θ2a+
2
4− θ2µ1
2− θ
4− θ2a+
2
4− θ2µ1
2− θ
4− θ2a+
2
4− θ2µ1
y2
2− θ
4− θ2a−
θ
4− θ2µ1
2− θ
4− θ2a−
θ
4− θ2µ1
2− θ
4− θ2a−
θ
4− θ2µ1
µ0 0
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)
3
z¯
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)
2
z¯
µ1
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 2σ
2
ε
= ak1
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 3σ
2
ε
= ak2
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 4σ
2
ε
= ak3
µ2
a2σε
√
l31k1√
2σu
√
2a2σε
√
l32k2√
3σu
√
3a2σε
√
l33k3
2σu
k k1 =
2−θ
4−θ2σ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 2σ
2
ε
, k2 =
2−θ
4−θ2σ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 3σ
2
ε
, k3 =
2−θ
4−θ2σ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 4σ
2
ε
,
l l1 =
2− θ
4− θ2 +
θ2 − 2
4− θ2k1 l2 =
2− θ
4− θ2 +
θ2 − 2
4− θ2k2 l3 =
2− θ
4− θ2 +
θ2 − 2
4− θ2k3
B
l21a
2
2
z¯
l22a
2
3
z¯
l23a
2
4
z¯
x˜1
σu
σz
z˜
√
2
2
σu
σz
z˜
√
3
3
σu
σz
z˜
x˜1
σu
√
l1√
2σε
√
k1
z˜
σu
√
l2√
6σε
√
k2
z˜
σu
√
l3
2
√
3σε
√
k3
z˜
x˜2
√
2
2
σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯) 2
√
3
3
σu
σz
(z˜ − z¯)
x˜2
σu
√
l2√
6σε
√
k2
(z˜ − z¯) σu
√
l3√
3σε
√
k3
(z˜ − z¯)
V ar(z˜|q˜, r˜) σ
2
ε
σ2z + 2σ
2
ε
σ2z
σ2ε
σ2z + 3σ
2
ε
σ2z
σ2ε
σ2z + 4σ
2
ε
σ2z
pi1(z˜)
2σuσ
4
εµ
2
1z˜
2
σ5z
3
√
2σuσ
4
εµ
2
1z˜
2
2σ5z
4
√
3σuσ
4
εµ
2
1z˜
2
3σ5z
pi1(z˜)
2σuµ
2
1z˜
2
α2σz
3
√
2σuµ
2
1z˜
2
2α2σz
4
√
3σuµ
2
1z˜
2
3α2σz
pi2(z˜)
3
√
2σuσ
4
εµ
2
1(z˜ − z¯)2
2σ5z
8
√
3σuσ
4
εµ
2
1(z˜ − z¯)2
3σ5z
pi2(z˜)
3
√
2σuµ
2
1(z˜ − z¯)2
2α2σz
8
√
3σuµ
2
1(z˜ − z¯)2
3α2σz
10
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Third, since real outputs are deterministic, the value of firm 1 is also a normal
random variable. The normality of these random variables allows us to derive
an explicit linear form for their conditional expected values. Hence, the stock
price set by the market makers, which satisfies the zero expected profits
condition, is linear. We present all the equilibrium outcomes in Table 1.
Proofs are delegated to Appendices A, B and C. The second order conditions
for the manager are,
2x1(z˜)z˜ > 0 and µ2 > 0, (13)
and the Hessian determinant is positive. The first condition in (13) is not
always satisfied since the support of the normal random variables is the entire
real line. Specifically, substituting the value of x1 from (11) in the left hand
condition in (13), we find,
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0
µ2
z˜ > 0. (14)
Since the second order condition in (14) is quadratic, there exits values of
z˜ for which the second order condition is not satisfied. Now, we present a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the linear equilibrium
for all z˜.
Proposition 1 A linear equilibrium exists if and only if,
µ0 = B2 =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)
3
z¯.
Proof: See Daher and Mirman (2006).
4 Discussion of the equilibrium
Before interpreting the results, let us highlight the relationship between our
three models and Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002), Daher and Mirman (2006,
2007), Wang et al. (2009) and Daher et al. (2012). Recall that odel 1
studies product differentiation in the real sector together with a monopoly
structure in the financial sector. Model 2 extends Model 1 to incorporate
Cournot competition in the financial sector. Finally, Model 3 extends Model
1 to include Stackelberg competition in the financial sector. First of all, note
11
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that Model 1 generalizes Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002).7 Indeed, Jain and
Mirman (2000) corresponds to the case where θ = 0, while Jain and Mirman
(2002) corresponds to the case where θ = 1. Similarly, Daher and Mirman
(2007) is obtained when we take θ = 0 in Model 2, where we add a second
insider to Model 1. Daher and Mirman (2006) corresponds to the case where
θ = 1 in Model 2. Finally, Model 3 generalizes Daher et al. (2012) and Wang
et al. (2009). The case where θ = 0 leads to Daher et al. (2012) while the
case where θ = 1 corresponds to Wang et al. (2009). In sum, our paper
generalizes the benchmark model of Jain and Mirman (2000) and almost8 all
the subsequent papers.
For this purpose, we decide to divide the comparative statics of this paper
into two parts. In the first part, we extend the results obtained in the two
particular cases where θ = 0 and θ = 1 to the case θ ∈ (0, 1). In the second
part, we highlight the role of the real market structure adopted in our three
models and its effect on the equilibrium outcomes. In other words, we study
the impact of the product differentiation parameter θ on our equilibrium
outcomes.
4.1 Part I: Extended results
Table 1 displays the equation of the market makers’ response to the real
signal coefficient µ1 in the three financial structures. First, note that µ1 in
the monopoly case (Model 1) is greater than µ1 in the duopoly case (Model
2) which itself is greater than µ1 in the Stackelberg case (Model 3). This
relation holds regardless of the degree of product differentiation (θ) and thus
is consistent with the literature. For example, Daher and Mirman (2007)
studied Cournot competition in the financial sector and monopoly in the real
sector. They found that µ1 is lower than in Jain and Mirman (2000) that
model a monopoly structure in both the real and financial sectors. Moreover,
Wang et al. (2009) who modeled Stackelberg competition in the financial
sector together with Cournot competition in the real sector, showed that µ1
is lower than in the duopoly structure in both the real and financial markets,
as studied by Daher and Mirman (2006). Daher et al. (2011) considered the
case of a monopoly structure in the real sector and Stackelberg competition
in the financial market. They also obtained a lower value for µ1 compared to
7Without loss of generality and for the sake of simplicity, the inverse demand slope, b
, used in the literature, is assumed to be equal to one in this paper.
8Note that Wang and Wang (2010) studied a Stackelberg competition in the real market
while Karam and Daher (2011) studied a two-tier real market structure and thus extended
Jain and Mirman (2000) in different directions.
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the monopoly case in the real market studied by Jain and Mirman (2000) and
Daher and Mirman (2007). To better understand this result, the expressions
of µ1 presented in Table 1 are given by
µ11 =
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 2σ
2
ε
, µ21 =
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 3σ
2
ε
, µ31 =
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 4σ
2
ε
where µi1 is the expression of µ1 in Model i (i = 1, 2, 3). Notice that, the
main difference between these expressions is captured by the coefficient of
the variance of the noise signal σ2ε in the denominator. The change of this
coefficient is due to the structure adopted in the financial market. The total
order flow signal is given by,
r˜ = β + γz˜ + u˜, (15)
where the noise term u˜ in the total order flow signal is homoscedastic9. Hence,
the greater the deterministic part γ of the total order flow signal, the more
informative the total order flow signal is and the greater the coefficient of
the variance of the noise signal σ2ε is. That is why the value of µ1 decreases
in Model 2 with respect to the monopoly case in Model 1. Similarly, Stack-
elberg competition increases the total order flow signal10 with respect to the
Cournot case and thus decreases the value of µ1 in Model 3. These results
reflect the fact the total order flow signal reveals more information with
Stackelberg competition in the financial sector than with Cournot competi-
tion, and more information with Cournot competition with respect to the
monopoly case. Thus, the value of µ1 decreases when we go from monopoly
to duopoly or from duopoly to Stackelberg.
Second, the expressions of firm 1’s output displayed in Table 1 reveal a pos-
itive relation between y1 and µ1. Consequently, firm 1’s output y1 in the
monopoly case is greater than y1 in the duopoly case which itself is greater
than y1 in the Stackelberg case. By contrast, there exists a negative relation
between y2 and µ1. Thus, firm 2’s output y2 in the monopoly case is lower
than the duopoly case which itself is lower than the Stackerlberg case. Note
that the degree of product differentiation θ does not alter the effect of the fi-
nancial structure on the firms’ output. The same conclusion is reached when
we compare Daher and Mirmam (2006) with Jain and Mirman (2002), and
Wang et al. (2009) with Daher and Mirman (2006). Recall that, the papers
9See Creane (1994).
10From Table 1, the aggregate orders of the insiders in Model 2, x˜1 + x˜2 is less than
x˜1 + x˜2 in Model 3.
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mentioned above, all model Cournot duopoly in the real sector. However, the
structure of the financial market differs between the three models. Jain and
Mirman (2002) study a monopoly structure in the financial sector, Daher and
Mirman (2006) model Cournot competition between the insiders and Wang
et al. (2009) introduce Stackelberg competition in the financial sector.
Third, due to the negative relationship between the noise signal coefficient µ1
and the intercept coefficient µ0 (which results from the zero expected profits
of the market maker), we infer that the value of µ0 in the Stackelberg case
(Model 3) is greater than in the Cournot case (Model 2). Note that in the
monopoly case the value of µ0, which results from the second order condition
of the manager, is always less than the µ0 of the two other models.
Fourth, the financial market structure affects the revelation of information in-
corporated in the stock price. Indeed, Table 1 shows that under Stackelberg
competition among the insiders, there is more information revealed in the
stock price in the Cournot case. In turn, the stock price reveals more infor-
mation with Cournot competition between the insiders than in the monopoly
case. Recall that, the expression of the real signal is given by
q˜ = (a− y1 − θy2)(z˜ + ε˜) (16)
while the total order flow signal is given by equation (15). Note that, the
noise term u˜ in the total order flow signal is homoscedastic while the noise
term (ε˜) in noise signal is heteroscedastic and multiplicative11, due to the
deterministic distributions of the real variables (outputs). Consequently, any
change in the financial market structure affects only the total order flow
signal. Hence, the greater the deterministic part γ of the total order flow
signal, the more informative is the total order flow signal. Adding a second
informed trader to the monopoly case (Model 2 ) or introducing Stackelberg
competition between the two informed traders (Model 3), changes the values
of the deterministic part of the total order flow signal. Such change alters
the market makers’ information about z only through the total order flow
signal.
Comparing the total order flow signal coefficients of Models 2 and 3, we find
that γ in Model 2 is greater than γ in Model 112. Consequently, adding Stack-
elberg competition in the financial sector increases the level of information
11See Creane (1994)
12Indeed, from Table 1, we infer that x˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 in Model 2 is greater than x˜ = x˜1 + x˜2
in Model 3.
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incorporated in the stock price set by the market makers with respect to the
Cournot case. Similarly, with Cournot competition in the financial sector,
there is more information revealed in the stock price than in the monopoly
case.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the amount of information revealed in
the stock price is independent of the degree of product differentiation θ. In
other words, for a specific financial market structure, monopoly for example,
Table 1 shows that the same amount of information is revealed in the stock
price for any value of θ ∈ [0, 1]. This is due to the deterministic distributions
of the real decision variables (outputs). Consequently, any change in such
variables has no effect of the revelation of information.
Note that, the trading orders of the insiders are affected by the financial mar-
ket structure. In line with the industrial organization theory, the manager’s
orders in the monopoly case (Model 1) are greater than his orders in the
duopoly case (Model 2) which themselves are greater than in the Stackelberg
case (Model 3). Moreover, in Model 3 and due to his leadership role in the fi-
nancial market, the owner’s orders are greater under Stackelberg competition
than his orders under Cournot competition. It should be pointed out that
surprisingly, all insiders’ orders do not depend entirely on the real market
structure and thus are independent of the degree of product differentiation θ.
Finally, we comment on the owner’s profits relation with the real market
structure. The owner in the financial Stackelberg case acts as a leader and
thus has a strategic advantage to the owner in the Cournot case. Conse-
quently, he earns more profits when Stackelberg structure is adopted in the
financial market than in Cournot case and this is independent of the real
market.
4.2 Part II: Product Differentiation Effects
In the previous section, we extended the results of almost all equilibrium
variables from the case θ = 0 and θ = 1 to the case where θ ∈ (0, 1). It re-
mains three variables whose comparative statics change with the real market
structure. Specifically, from Table 1, we infer that the degree of differentia-
tion θ and the ratio of the exogenous variances α =
σ2z
σ2ε
are the determinants
of the product differentiation effect on the market makers’ response to the
total order flow, µ2, the compensation scheme received by the manager, B,
and the managers profits, p˜i.
15
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Figure 1:
µ12
µ22
Ratio of the market maker’s response to the total order flow
of Models 1 and 2
4.2.1 The market makers’ response to the total order flow
We analyze the product differentiation effect on the market makers’ response
to the total order flow, µ2. We computed in Appendix D the ratio (and its
properties) of µ2 in any two different models. The calculations reveal the
existence of a lower bound α and an upper bound α¯ such that, for all the
values of α that do not belong to the interval (α, α¯) (see Figure 1), the ratio
is independent from the real market structure. In other words, the ratio is
either greater than one (for α ≤ α) or less than one (for α ≥ α¯). However,
for the values of α inside the interval, the real market structure through the
degree of differentiation θ, determines the level of the compensation earned
by the manager.
Figure 1 provides the values of the µ2’s ratio of Models 1 and 2 corresponding
to three different values of α. The value of α corresponding to this case is
0.38 and α¯ = 0.57. Figure 1-a shows that when α = 0.3 (less than α = 0.38)
the ratio is always greater than one, regardless of the real market structure.
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In other words, the value of µ2 in the monopolistic financial market is higher
than µ2 in the presence of Cournot competition between the insiders. Indeed,
when α is getting lower, the real signal becomes more noisy and thus less
informative for the market marker. The expected value of firm 1 in both the
monopolistic and the Cournot competition models is given by
(a− y2 − θy1)y2z¯ −B2 (17)
When α is getting lower, the expected value of firm 1 in the monopolistic
case becomes close to the expected value of firm 1 in the duopoly case. In
this case, the result is similar to the Kyle (1985) type models, that is, the
coefficient of the order flow decreases as the number of insiders increases and
the value of the firm is the same (see Tighe 1989).
In Figure 1-b, we plot the ratio of µ2 of Models 1 and 2 when α = 0.5
(between the lower and upper bounds α and α¯). For this value of α, there
exists a level of differentiation degree θ∗ = 0.8 below which µ2 is greater in the
presence of Cournot competition in the financial market than in the presence
of a monopoly structure in the financial market. However, for the values of
θ greater than 0.8, the inverse holds, i.e. µ2 in the monopolistic financial
market is greater than µ2 in the Cournot financial market. To understand
the result, we recall the expressions of the unconditional profits of firm 1 in
the monopoly and duopoly cases respectively derived from the zero profit
condition of the market maker.
(a− ym2 − θym1 )ym2 z¯ −B1 = µm1 q¯m + µm2 r¯m (18)
(a− yd2 − θyd1)yd2 z¯ −B2 = µd1q¯d + µd2r¯d (19)
where the superscripts m and d refer to monopoly and duopoly respectively.
When α ∈ (α and α¯) and θ < θ∗, the left hand side of Eqs (18) and (19) are
close in value and thus the right hand side must be close. In this case, µ2 in
the monopolistic case is greater than µ2 in the duopoly case. For θ > θ
∗, the
unconditional profits of firm 1 in the monopolistic case in lower than in the
duopoly case. Thus, the zero expected profit condition provides that µ2 in
the duopoly case is greater than µ2 in the monopoly case.
Figure 1-c shows that for α = 0.7 > α∗ = 0.57, the value of µ2 in the financial
duopoly case is greater than µ2 in the monopoly case (the ratio is greater
than one) and this is regardless of the market structure adopted in the real
market (for all values of θ). For this value of α, the left hand side of (18)
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is always less than the left hand side of (19). Hence, the right hand side of
(18) must be less than the right hand side of (19). Such increase in profits
going from the monopoly to the duopoly structure in the financial market,
given that µ1 decreases more in the duopoly case than in the monopoly case,
implies that the more informative signal be given more weight, thus µ2 in
the duopoly case is greater than µ2 in the monopoly case.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, the analysis we provided in studying
the comparative statics between Models 1 and 2 is applicable for the study
of Models 1 and 3 or Models 2 and 3. For example, when α < α and going
from duopoly to Stackelberg in the financial market, µ2 in the duopoly be-
comes greater than µ2 in Stackelberg. The reason is the same as in the study
we did for Models 1 and 2, i.e. for this value of α, the real signal becomes
less informative and the unconditional profits of firm 1 in both the duopoly
and Stackelberg cases are close. Thus, the model resembles to the Kyle-type
models with the same value of the firm, that is the coefficient of the order
flow decreases when we go from duopoly to Stackelberg in the financial mar-
ket (see Daher et al. 2012).
4.2.2 Compensation Scheme
We turn now to analyze the product differentiation effect on the compensa-
tion scheme received by the manager in each of the models studied in the
paper. We computed in Appendix E the ratio (and its properties) of the
compensation scheme for any two different models. There exists a lower
bound α and an upper bound α¯ such that, for all the values of α that do not
belong to the interval (α, α¯) (see Figure 2), the ratio is independent from the
real market structure. In other words, the ratio is either greater than 1 (for
α ≤ α) or less than 1 (for α ≥ α¯). However, for the values of α inside the
interval, the real market structure through the degree of differentiation, θ,
determines the level of the compensation earned by the manager.
Figure 2 provides values of the compensation scheme ratio of Models 1 and
2 corresponding to three different values of α. The value of α corresponding
to this case is 2
√
6 and α¯ = 3
√
6. Figure 2-a shows that when α = 4 (less
than α = 2
√
6), the ratio is always greater than one, regardless of the real
market structure. In other words, the compensation scheme of the manager
in the monopolistic financial market is higher that his compensation in the
presence of Cournot competition between the insiders. Indeed, when α is
getting lower, the real signal becomes more noisy and thus less informative
18
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for the market marker. Hence, the manager of the firm profits from this
opportunity to earn a higher compensation than in the Cournot case where
he does not have market power due to the presence of the second insider (the
owner).
To understand this relationship between the exogenous variances, the degree
of differentiation and the compensation scheme of the manager, recall the
expression of the compensation scheme of each of the models (see Table 1):
B1 =
l21a
2
2
z¯, B2 =
l22a
2
3
z¯, B3 =
l23a
2
4
z¯ (20)
First, note that we showed in Appendix C that l1 < l2 < l3 and this relation
is independent of the exogenous variances and the degree of differentiation.
Second, the financial market structure determines the value of the denomi-
nator in the compensation scheme expressions. For example, in the financial
monopolistic case, the denominator is two. However, in the duopoly case it
becomes three. Thus, the comparison of the compensation schemes in Mod-
els 1 and 2 for example, is based on the relation between
l1
2
and
l2
3
. Note
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that, when α is less than α, the expressions of l1 and l2 are close to each
other and consequently the compensation scheme in the financial Cournot
case is lower than in the financial monopoly case.
In Figure 2-b, we plot the ratio of the compensation scheme of Models 1 and
2 when α = 6 (between the lower and upper bounds α and α¯). For this value
of α, there exists a level of differentiation degree θ∗ = 0.75 below which the
manager earns more compensation in the presence of Cournot competition
in the financial market than in the presence of a monopoly structure in the
financial market. However, for the values of θ greater than 0.75, the inverse
holds, i.e., in the monopolistic financial market, the manager earns more
compensation than in the Cournot financial market.
For α ∈ (α, α¯), the relation between l1
2
and
l2
3
depends on the degree of differ-
entiation. Indeed, when the goods are less substitutable, the manager earns
more compensation under the financial Cournot competition than the mo-
nopolistic financial structure. However, when the goods are close substitutes
to each others, the manager’s compensation is higher in the monopolistic
financial structure than the Cournot case.
For the last case, when α is greater than α¯, Figure 2-c shows that for α = 8,
the ratio of the compensation schemes of Models 1 and 2 is always greater
than one. In other words, the manager’s compensation in the financial
Cournot case is greater than his compensation in the financial monopoly
case. In this case, the value of l1 is relatively small compared to l2 and thus
the compensation scheme is the monopoly case is less than in the Cournot
case.
4.2.3 Manager’s profits
The manager’s profits depend crucially on the exogenous variances and the
real market structure. Indeed, as for the case of the compensation scheme,
we distinguish three cases of relationship between the manager’s profits in
Models 1 and 2. In Appendix F, the ratio of the manager’s profits of any
two models is computed. There exist a lower bound α and upper bound α¯
which characterize the relationship between the manager’s profits in any two
different models. Figure 3 displays the values of the manager’s profits ratio
for Models and 1 and 2.
For α less than α (Figure 3-a), the manager’s profits in the monopolistic case
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are greater than in the Cournot case. From Table 1, the expressions of the
manager’s profits in the monopoly and duopoly cases, respectively are
2σuσ
4
εµ
2
1z˜
2
σ5z
3
√
2σuσ
4
εµ
2
1z˜
2
2σ5z
(21)
Note that 2µM1 and
3
√
2
2
µD1 determine the relationship of the manager’s prof-
its of Models 1 an 2. For α less than α, 2µM1 is always greater than
3
√
2
2
µD1
and thus the manager’s profits are greater in the monopoly case than in the
duopoly case. The intuition behind is that for such values of α, increasing
the number of insiders increases the informational content of the total order
flow signal r˜ which in turn reduces the manager’s profits in the duopoly case
relative to the monopoly case.
For α ∈ (α, α¯) (Figure 3-b), the real market structure determines the relation-
ship of the manager’s profits of Models 1 and 2. Indeed, there exists a level
of differentiation θ∗ below which the manager’s profits under the monopoly
case are less than in the Cournot case. However, when the real products
become more substitutable (θ > θ∗), the manager’s profits in the monopoly
case are greater than those in the Cournot case. In this case, the real signal
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q˜ and the total order flow signal r˜ disseminate information to the market
maker. Together with the real market structure have a direct effect on the
unconditional profits of the manager through the zero profits condition of
the market makers.
In the last case when α > α¯ (Figure 3-c), the real market structure has no
effect on the relationship of the manager’s profits of Models 1 and 2. For such
values of α, the manager’s profits in the financial Cournot case are always
greater than in the monopoly case. Note that in this case, the real signal
q˜ is more informative than the total order flow signal r˜. This informational
content reduces the value of firm 1 in the monopoly case which in turn re-
duces the manager’s profits in the monopoly case relative to the Cournot case.
It should be pointed out that when real decisions are made, going from one
insider (Model 1) to two insiders (Model 2) has an ambiguous effect on the
manager’s profits. Indeed, Daher et al.(2012) extended Jain and Mirman
(1999) to the Cournot case. In both models, no real market is considered.
The authors show that going from one to two insiders, the manager’s profits
always decrease. However, with real decisions, the manager’s profits depend
on both the real and the financial structure.
Appendix A
We start this appendix by recalling the Theorem that we use to prove the
results in Table 1.
Theorem 1 If the p× 1 vector Y is normally distributed with mean U and
covariance V and if the vector Y is partitioned into two subvectors such that
Y =
(
Y1
Y2
)
and if Y ∗ =
(
Y1
Y ∗2
)
U =
(
U1
U2
)
and V =
(
V11 V12
V21 V22
)
are the corresponding partitions of Y ∗,U and V, then the conditional dis-
tribution of the m × 1 (m < p) vector Y1 given the vector Y2 = Y ∗2 is the
multivariate normal distribution with mean U1 + V12V
−1
22 (Y
∗
2 - U2) and co-
variance matrix V11 − V12V −122 V21.
Proof : See Graybill, Theorem 3.10 pp 63.
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We apply Theorem 1 to the normal random vector B = (v˜, q˜, r˜). First, in
this case we have p = 3 and m = 1. Second ,by identification, we have Y1 = v˜
and Y2 =
(
q˜
r˜
)
. U1 = v¯, U2 =
(
q¯
r¯
)
and
V =
 σ2v σvq σvrσvq σ2q σqr
σvr σqr σ
2
r
 = ( V11 V12
V21 V22
)
where V11 = σ
2
v , V12 = (σvq, σvr), V21 =
(
σvq
σvr
)
and V22 =
(
σ2q σqr
σqr σ
2
r
)
.
Note that
V −122 =
1
D
(
σ2r −σqr
−σqr σ2q
)
,
where D is the determinant of V22, that is D = σ
2
qσ
2
r − σ2qr.
So we obtain,
µ0 = v¯ − µ1q¯ − µ2r¯ (22)
µ1 =
σvqσ
2
r − σvrσqr
D
(23)
µ2 =
σvrσ
2
q − σvqσqr
D
(24)
We start now by computing all the covariances in the last two expressions.
Indeed, we have
σvq = (a− y1 − θy2)2y1σ2z
σ2r =
(a− y1 − θy2)2(y1 − µ1)2
4µ22
σ2z + σ
2
u
σvr =
(a− y1 − θy2)2(y1 − µ1)y1
2µ2
σ2z
σ2q = (a− y1 − θy2)2(σ2z + σ2ε)
σqr =
(a− y1 − θy2)2(y1 − µ1)
2µ2
σ2z
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Substituting for the variances and covariances in (23) and (24), we get
µ1 =
(a− y1 − θy2)2y1σ2zσ2u
D
, (25)
µ2 =
(a− y1 − θy2)4y1(y1 − µ1)σ2zσ2ε
µ2D
. (26)
Computing (25) and (26), we obtain
µ22 =
(a− y1 − θy2)2µ1(y1 − µ1)σ2ε
2σ2u
(27)
Calculating for the expression of D, we get
D =
(a− y1 − θy2)4(y1 − µ1)2σ2εσ2z
4µ22
+ (a− y1 − θy2)2σ2u(σ2ε + σ2z).
Substituting the above expression of D in (26), we find
µ22 =
(a− y1 − θy2)2(y1 − µ1)(y1 + µ1)σ2εσ2z
4σ2u(σ
2
ε + σ
2
z)
. (28)
Solving (27) and (28), we get
2µ1(σ
2
ε + σ
2
z) = σ
2
z(y1 + µ1).
Substituting for y to solve µ1, we obtain
µ1 =
2−θ
4−θ2aσ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 2σ
2
ε
(29)
To solve for µ2, we substitute the above value of µ1 in (27) and taking the
positive root, we get
µ2 =
a2σε
√
l3k√
2σu
, (30)
where k =
2−θ
4−θ2 σ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2 σ
2
z+2σ
2
ε
and l = 2−θ
4−θ2 +
θ2−2
4−θ2k
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Appendix B
Here, the main change with respect to appendix A is the reaction curves
derivation of each insider. Indeed, the owner first decides the stock order
x2(z˜) and second the manager of firm 1, chooses the output y1 as well as
his order x1(z˜). Proceeding backward by solving first the manager’s problem
and then the owner’s maximization problem, the manager moves second and
hence his reaction curve is given by
x1(z˜) =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 − µ2x˜2
2µ2
(31)
Now plugging (31) into the profit function of the owner and taking the first
order condition we find,
x˜2 =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 − 2B3
2µ2
(32)
which implies that
x˜1 =
(a− y1 − θy2)(y1 − µ1)z˜ − µ0 + 2B3
4µ2
(33)
Appendix C
We show that the value of l is always positive in the three models studied in
this paper. First, one can remark that (after arrangement) that
l1 ≤ l2 and l1 ≤ l3
where li is the expression of l corresponding to Model i (i = 1, 2, 3). Hence,
if we show that l1 is positive, then l2 and l3 are also positive. Indeed, recall
that
k1 =
2−θ
4−θ2σ
2
z
2−θ2
4−θ2σ
2
z + 2σ
2
ε
and l1 =
2− θ
4− θ2 +
θ2 − 2
4− θ2k (34)
Now, we define α = σ
2
z
σ2ε
. Hence equation (34) becomes
k1 =
(2− θ)α
(2− θ2)α + 2(4− θ2) and l1 =
2− θ + (θ2 − 2)k
4− θ2 (35)
Since θ ∈ [0, 1] proving that l1 is equivalent to prove that
2− θ + (θ2 − 2)k1 ≥ 0 (36)
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Substituting the expression of k1 from (35) into the expression in (36) and
using the fact that θ ∈ [0, 1], we deduce that 2−θ+(θ2−2)k1 ≥ 0 and hence
l1 is always positive.
Appendix D
We compute the ratio of the market marker’s response to the order flow signal
of any two models studied in this paper. From Table 1 note that,
µi2
µj2
=
√
i√
j
i+ 1
j + 1
.
(
(2− θ2)α + (j + 1)(4− θ2)
(2− θ2)α + (i+ 1)(4− θ2)
)2
, α =
σ2z
σ2ε
, i 6= j. (37)
Without loss of generality, assume that i < j and consider the two following
cases:
Case 1: α→ 0. In this case µ
i
2
µj2
→
√
i√
j
j + 1
i+ 1
> 1
Case 2: α→∞. In this case µi2
µj2
→
√
i√
j
i+ 1
j + 1
< 1
Hence, we deduce that
µi2
µj2
∈
(√
i√
j
i+ 1
j + 1
,
√
i√
j
j + 1
i+ 1
)
∀α and θ.
Moreover, note that
µi2
µj2
is increasing in θ (its derivative is positive) and thus
there exist a lower bound denoted by α = 2
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1
4
√
i
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√j
4
√
j
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√i
(corresponding to θ = 0) and an upper bound denoted by
α¯ = 3
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1
4
√
i
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√j
4
√
j
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√i (corresponding to θ = 1) such
that (see Figure 1):
1-
µi2
µj2
is always greater than 1 for all values α ≤ α and for all values of θ.
2-
µi2
µj2
is always lower than 1 for all values α ≥ α¯ and for all values of θ.
3-
µi2
µj2
depends on θ when α ∈ (α, α¯).
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Appendix E
In this appendix we compute the ratio of the compensation schemes of any
two models studied in this paper. From Table 1 note that,
Bi
Bj
=
j + 1
i+ 1
.
(
li
lj
)2
i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, 3 (38)
Substituting the corresponding expressions of li and lj respectively from Ta-
ble 1 into equation (38) we obtain
Bi
Bj
=
i+ 1
j + 1
.
(
(2− θ2)α + (j + 1)(4− θ2)
(2− θ2)α + (i+ 1)(4− θ2)
)2
, α =
σ2z
σ2ε
, i 6= j. (39)
Without loss of generality, assume that i < j and consider the two following
cases:
Case 1: α→ 0. In this case Bi
Bj
→ j + 1
i+ 1
> 1
Case 2: α→∞. In this case Bi
Bj
→ i+ 1
j + 1
< 1
Hence, we deduce that
Bi
Bj
∈
(
i+ 1
j + 1
,
j + 1
i+ 1
)
∀α and θ.
Moreover, note that
Bi
Bj
is increasing in θ (its derivative is positive) and thus
there exist a lower bound denoted by α = 2
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1 (corresponding to
θ = 0) and an upper bound denoted by α¯ = 3
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1 (corresponding
to θ = 1) such that (see Figure 2):
1- Bi
Bj
is always greater than 1 for all values α ≤ α and for all values of θ.
2- Bi
Bj
is always lower than 1 for all values α ≥ α¯ and for all values of θ.
3- Bi
Bj
depends on θ when α ∈ (α, α¯).
Appendix F
We derive The ratio of the manager’s profits of any two models studied in
this paper. From Table 1 note that,
pii1
pij1
=
√
j√
i
i+ 1
j + 1
.
(
µi1
µij
)2
, i 6= j. (40)
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Substituting the expressions of µ1 from Table 1, we obtain
pii1
pij1
=
√
j√
i
i+ 1
j + 1
.
(
(2− θ2)α + (j + 1)(4− θ2)
(2− θ2)α + (i+ 1)(4− θ2)
)2
, α =
σ2z
σ2ε
, i 6= j. (41)
Without loss of generality, assume that i < j and consider the two following
cases:
Case 1: α→ 0. In this case pi
i
1
pij1
→
√
j√
i
j + 1
i+ 1
> 1
Case 2: α→∞. In this case pii1
pij1
→
√
j√
i
i+ 1
j + 1
< 1
Hence, we deduce that
pii1
pij1
∈
(√
j√
i
i+ 1
j + 1
,
√
j√
i
j + 1
i+ 1
)
∀α and θ.
Moreover, note that
pii1
pij1
is increasing in θ (its derivative is positive) and thus
there exist a lower bound denoted by α = 2
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1
4
√
j
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√i
4
√
i
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√j
(corresponding to θ = 0) and an upper bound denoted by
α¯ = 3
√
i+ 1
√
j + 1
4
√
j
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√i
4
√
i
√
j + 1−√i+ 1 4√j (corresponding to θ = 1) such
that (see Figure 3):
1-
pii1
pij1
is always greater than 1 for all values α ≤ α and for all values of θ.
2-
pii1
pij1
is always lower than 1 for all values α ≥ α¯ and for all values of θ.
3-
pii1
pij1
depends on θ when α ∈ (α, α¯).
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